ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is incorporated in our daily life. This technology is employed in many applications such as public transportation passes [2] , supply chain management [3] , e-passport [4] , access control systems [5] and etc [6, 7] . RFID systems include tags, readers and back-end server. A tag is a low cost device which has a microchip, small memory and antenna to communicate with the reader. Readers are placed between tags and backend server as an intermediary for message transmission. On the other hand, the back-end server has the whole information and secret values of all tags.
EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 is a standard that is provided by EPCglobal (Electronic Product Code) organization [8, 9] . This standard provides a framework for RFID communications. EPC C-1 G-2 has restricted tags to some simple arithmetic operations such as CRC (Cyclic Redundancy checksum Code), PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) and bitwise XOR. Therefore, RFID authentication protocols based on EPC C-1 G-2 standard have undergone some difficulties to provide perfect security aspects.
One of the most important challenges related to RFID systems is security problems. In order to have secure authentication protocols, it is important that an adversary does not able to get any information related to the target tag. Privacy and untraceability are two important issues relevant to RFID systems.Thus, an authentication protocol should assure the privacy characteristics such as untraceabilityand backward untraceability for tags and their holders [10] .
Mentioned attacks aside, different threats related to RFID authentication protocols are mentioned as follows.
• Information leakage: When a tag and reader communicate each other, they perform an authentication protocol and exchange some messages. The wireless communication channel between the tag and reader is insecure and it can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Therefore, each authentication protocol should be designed in a way that the adversary, with significant computational capabilities, does not be able to exploit the exchanged messages. Namely, the exchanged messages should not leak any information to the adversary [11] .
• Tag Tracing and tracking: Tag tracing and tracking are damaging problems in RFID systems. Although the leakage of information is impossible, the untraceability of tag and its holder is not guaranteed in RFID systems. Indeed, untraceability means that if an adversary eavesdrops message transmission between a target tag and a reader at time t, he does not be able to distinguish an interaction of that tag at time t't [12] .
• DoS attack: denial-of-Service (DoS) is one category of attacks on RFID systems. An attacker tries to find ways to fail target tag from receiving services. In desynchronization attack, which is one kind of DoS attacks, the shared secret values among the tag and the back-end server are made inconsistent by an attacker. Then, the tag and back-end server cannot recognize each other in future and tag becomes disabled [13] .
Many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed until now [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] . Although mentioned protocols have wanted to provide secure and untraceable communication for RFID systems; many weaknesses have been found in them [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38] .However, Yeh et al. [1] have recently proposed a RFID mutual authentication protocol compatible with EPC C-1 G-2 standard that we name SRP (Securing RFID Protocol) in this paper. The authors have claimed that not only does not reveal SRP any information but also it has forward secrecy characteristic. Besides, robustness against DoSattack is the other claimed attribute of SRP. In this study, we show that SRP is vulnerable to a powerful and fatal attack that needs only 2 16 off-line PRNG computations. Despite of this attack, the whole security of this protocol will be destroyed inasmuch as RFID system is most vulnerable to tag and reader impersonation and DoS attack. Furthermore, we show that the SPR does not assure untraceability and backward untraceability. The notion backward untraceabilityis defined in section 4.
RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly study some authentication protocolswhichhave been proposedto provide secure communications in RFID systems. Dimitriou proposed an RFID authentication scheme that uses a challenge-response mechanism [39] .Since the tag identifier remains constant between two successful sessions, this protocol is vulnerable to tracking attacks and tag impersonation attack. In [40] , a lightweight authentication protocol is proposed by Ohkubo et. Al. This scheme provides indistinguishability and forward security characteristics. The scheme is based on a hash chain and uses two dissimilar hash functions H and G. This protocol does not provide protection against an adversary that tries to de-synchronize the server and the tags, consequently resulting in a DoS attack. Juels [36] showed that cloning and counterfeiting attacks are applied simply on EPC tags. He proposed an unclonable authentication protocol to solve these problems. However, Duc et al. [20] have presented some weaknesses related to privacy and information leakage in Juels scheme. In [41] ,Karthikeyan and Nesterenko suggested a security protocol without complex cryptographic primitives. Only XOR and matrix operations were used in their scheme. Chien and Chen [12] showed that this protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks and does not assure the untraceability property.
A mutual authentication protocol under the EPC C-1 G-2 standard was proposed by Chien and Chen [14] . They had used simple XOR, CRC and PRNG in their scheme. In [14] each tag needs to keep an EPC code and two secret keys ‫ܭ‬ , ܲ . Secret key ‫ܭ‬ is used to tag authentication and secret key ܲ is used to reader authentication. Both ‫ܭ‬ and ܲ are updated in each round whereas EPC code is permanent. For each tagsecret values ‫ܭ‬ ௗ , ܲ ௗ , ‫ܭ‬ ௪ , ܲ ௪ , EPC and DATA are stored in database. The protocol is initialed with sending a random number ܰ ோ by the reader. As a result, the tag replies with (M1, ܰ ் ) where M1=CRC(EPC॥ܰ ோ ॥ܰ ் ‫ܭ⨁)‬ . After receiving the tag's response, the database searches for finding the correct tag and its corresponding information
Thenthe database computes M2=CRC(EPC॥ܰ ் )⨁ܲ ௫ (x= old or new) and sends tag M2. At that point the database updates its secret keys as following:
The tag receives M2 and checks whether M2⨁ܲ =CRC(EPC॥ܰ ் ). If it satisfies, the tag authenticates the database and updates ‫ܭ‬ and ܲ the same as with the database, else it terminates the protocol.
Lopez et al. [37] showed some weaknesses of Chien and Chen's protocol including tag and reader impersonation and desynchronization attack. They also showed that this protocol does not guarantee forward security and it is vulnerable to tracing attack. Han and Kwon [15] also presented a desynchronization attack and two tag impersonation attacks on Chien and Chen's protocol in new methods. These attacks were mainly based on weak secure properties of CRC.
REVIEW SRP

Notations
We use the notations the same as the notations were used in the original paper [1] .
A: malicious adversary EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ : 16-bit string which is built by XORing six16-bit blocks of EPC code ‫ܥ‬ :The database index stored in the tag to find the corresponding record of the tag in the database 
Initialization Phase
For each tag the database is preloaded with nine secretvalues 
The (i+1)th Authentication Round
The steps of the authentication phase in the round (i+1) of the protocol are presented as follows.
1. The reader generates number ܰ ோ at random and sends it to the tag.
2. After receiving ܰ ோ , first the tag generates random number ܰ ் , then it computes: 
Then it checks whether ‫ܫ‬ ௗ or ‫ܫ‬ ௪ matches PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோ ). This process is repeated by database until a matching would be found.Dependent on which ‫ܫ‬ ௗ or ‫ܫ‬ ௪ matches, value X is set to old or new.
(ii) If‫ܥ‬ ് 0, the database uses ‫ܥ‬ as an index to find the corresponding recorded entry. When the database finds an entry that ‫ܥ‬ matches, if it matches ‫ܥ‬ ௗ then the value X is set to old, otherwise the value X is set to new. Then corresponding ‫ܭ‬ and EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ are extracted to check if PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோ ‫ܭ⨁)‬ is equal to M1. By XORing the extracted ‫ܭ‬ with the received D, the database obtains ܰ ் and ensures about correctnessof the value ܰ ் by checking whether ܰ ் ⨁PRNG(‫ܥ‬ ‫ܭ⨁‬ ) is equal to the received E. 
5. The reader XORs RID with the received Info and extracts DATA, then it sends M2 to the tag. The tag picks up the stored ܲ and computes ܲ ⨁M2to find whether it is equal to PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ் ). If the matching would be found, the database is authenticated and the tag updates as follows:
VULNERABILITIES of SRP
In this section we will show the most important vulnerabilities of SRP. We first present a practical and powerful attack on SRP in which an adversary obtains the most important secret value of a tag which calledEP‫ܥ‬ ௦ . Aside from the above problem, the SRP is also vulnerable to tracing attacks. We show that the SRP does not provide backward untraceabilityand untraceability.
Reveal EP
In SRP it is mentioned that EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ is a 16-bit string which is constructed from XORing six 16-bit blocks of EPC code. Since ܰ ோ and ܰ ் are XORed with EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , we conclude the bit lengths of ܰ ோ and ܰ ் are the same as bit length of EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ Which is 16. Since ‫ܭ‬ , ܲ and ‫ܥ‬ are updated by PRNG, the bit lengths of them must be equal to the output length of PRNG which is 16.
In SRP the bit length of EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ is very short and it is also fix in all rounds of the protocol, thus an adversary can exploit this weakness to get EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ . He just needs to perform two consecutive sessions with the target tag and then calculate 2 ଵ off-line PRNG computations. The procedure of our attack is explained as follows.
• The adversary starts a session with the target tag T i in the round (i+1) by sending random number ܰ ோଵ .T i replies with ‫ܥ(‬ , M1 ଵ ‫ܦ,‬ ଵ , ‫ܧ‬ ଵ ). The adversary reserves M1 ଵ and terminates the session. Then he performs the second session with T i by sending ܰ ோଶ and gets tag's response as ‫ܥ(‬ , M1 ଶ ‫ܦ,‬ ଶ , ‫ܧ‬ ଶ ).
• Since the first session is not completed, T i does not update its secret key ‫ܭ‬ for the second session. Hence M1 ଵ and M1 ଶ are constructed as follows:
Where ߚ is a 16-bit string as a result of M1 ଵ ⨁M1 ଶ .
• Let L={݈ ଵ ,݈ ଶ , …, ݈ ଶ భల } be the set of all bit strings with length 16. Since EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ is a bit string with length 16, thusEP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ‫א‬L. By having ߚ, ܰ ோଵ and ܰ ோଶ , the adversary proceeds according to the below algorithm:
End for
After at most 2 ଵ execution of the algorithm, the adversary finds the correct EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ . As a result of the above attack and due to knowing the value of EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , we present three important attacks on SRP.
Tag Impersonation
By having EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , the adversary simply gets the secret key ‫ܭ‬ by a passive attack. He listens to the communication channel between the legitimate reader R and the target tag T i in the round (i+1) to obtain ܰ ோଷ and ‫ܥ(‬ , M1 ଷ ‫ܦ,‬ ଷ , ‫ܧ‬ ଷ ). Since the adversary has EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , he computes PRNG (EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோଷ ). Thus thesecret key ‫ܭ‬ is computed as: ‫ܭ‬ = M1 ଷ ⨁(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோଷ ) and ‫ܭ‬ ାଵ = PRNG ‫ܭ(‬ ).
The random number ܰ ்ଷ is computed as: ܰ ்ଷ = D⨁‫ܭ‬ and finally the index for the next session is computed as ‫ܥ‬ ݅1 =PRNG (ܰ ்ଷ ⨁ܰ ோଷ ) Now, the adversary starts a new session with the reader. R sends ܰ ோସ to him and he replies with
Because these values are calculated correctly, the database accepts the adversary and authenticates him.
Reader Impersonation and DoS Attack
Aside from tag impersonation, SRP is also vulnerable against two other attacks. By revealing EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , the adversary can forge a legitimate reader and then desynchronize the target tag. The procedure of these attacks is explained as following.
• The adversary listens to the communication between R and T i in the round (i+1) to obtain ܰ ோହ , ‫ܥ(‬ , M1 ହ ‫ܦ,‬ ହ , ‫ܧ‬ ହ ) and M2 ହ . Since the adversary has EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , he computes PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோହ ) and gets the secret key ‫ܭ‬ as: ‫ܭ‬ =M1 ହ ⨁PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ோହ ) and ‫ܭ‬ ାଵ =PRNG(‫ܭ‬ ). The secret key ܲ is gotten as: ܲ =M2 ହ ⨁PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ்ହ ) and ܲ ାଵ =PRNG (ܲ ሻ where ܰ ்ହ ‫ܦ=‬ ହ ‫ܭ⨁‬ .
• He begins a new session with T i and sends it ܰ ோ . T i replies with ‫ܥ(‬ ାଵ , M1 ‫ܦ,‬ , ‫ܧ‬ ) which are created with the help ofEP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , ܰ ோ , ‫ܭ‬ , ܰ ் and ‫ܥ‬ ାଵ .
• After receiving the tag's response, the adversary extracts ܰ ் as: ܰ ் ‫ܦ=‬ ‫ܭ⨁‬ , then he computes M2 ହ =PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ் )⨁ܲ ାଵ and sends it to the tag.
• T i checks whether M2 ହ ⨁ܲ ାଵ =PRNG(EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ⨁ܰ ் ), since this condition is satisfied, T i authenticates the adversary and updates its secret values as :
When this session is terminated, the stored secret values on T i are ‫ܭ(‬ ାଶ ,ܲ ାଶ , ‫ܥ‬ ݅2 ,EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ ) whereas the database has stored ‫ܭ(‬ , ܲ , ‫ܥ‬ , ‫ܭ‬ ାଵ , ܲ ାଵ , ‫ܥ‬ ݅1 ,RID,EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ , DATA). Now, they are desynchronized, since the secret values stored in database are completely different from the values stored in the tag.
Privacy Analysis
The authors of SRP have claimed that their protocol has forward secrecy as well as the SRP is resistant to the tracing attacks. We show that the SRP has not forward secrecy. Aside from this weakness, we also present an attacks on untraceabilityof SRP.
Privacy Model
Some privacy models have been proposed by researchers to evaluation of RFID protocols [10, 42, 43, 44] .Juels and Weis gave a formal definition of the privacy and untraceability model [42] . The samedefinition is described by Ouafi and Phan in their work presented in ISPEC'08 [44] and we will use this model to analyze the SRP protocol.The model that has been described in [44] is summarized as follows. The protocol parties are tags (T) and readers (R) which interact in protocol sessions. In this model an adversaryAcontrols the communication channel between all parties by interacting either passively or actively with them. The adversaryAis allowed to run the following queries:
• Execute (R, T, i )query. This query models the passive attacks. The adversary Aeavesdrops on the communication channel between T and R and gets read access to the exchanged messages between the parties in session i of a truthful protocol execution.
• Send (U, V, m, i) query. This query models activeattacks by allowing the adversaryAto impersonate some reader U ‫א‬R(respectively tag V‫א‬T ) in some protocol session iand send a messagemof its choice to an instance of some tag V ‫א‬T(respectively reader U ‫א‬R ). Furthermore the adversary A is allowed to block or alert the message mthat is sent from U to V(respectively V to U) in session iof a truthful protocol execution.
• Corrupt(T, ‫ܭ‬ ′ ) query. This query allows the adversaryA to learn the stored secretK of the tagT‫א‬T, and which further sets the stored secret to‫ܭ‬ ′ .Corrupt query means that the adversary has physical access to the tag, i.e., the adversary can read and tamper with the tag's permanent memory.
• Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. This query does not correspond to any of A's abilities, but it is necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for sessioni, a random bit b‫,0{א‬ 1} is generated and then, A is givenT b ‫א‬ {T o , T 1 ). Informally, Awins if he can guess the bit b.
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game g played between an adversary A and a collection of the reader and the tag instances. The game gisdivided into three following phases:
Learning phase:A is given tags T o and T 1 randomly and he is able to send any Execute, Send and Corrupt queries of its choice to T 0 , T 1 and reader.
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T 0 , T 1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b ‫א‬ {0, 1}, A is given a tag T b from the set {T 0 , T 1 }.Acontinues making any Execute, and Send queries at will.
Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b' ‫,0{א‬ 1}, which is its guess of the value of b.
The success ofAin winning gamegand thus breaking the notion ofUPrivis quantified in termsAadvantage in distinguishing whetherAreceivedT 0 or T 1 and denoted by ‫ܞ܌ۯ‬ ‫ۯ‬ ‫ܞܑܚ۾܃‬ (k)
where k is the security parameter.
In [10] , the notionbackward untraceability is defined as: " backward untraceability states that even if given all the internal states of a target tag at time t, the adversary shouldn't be able to identify the target tag's interactions that occur at time t' < t. ".
Backward Untraceability
In this section we will show how to break the notion backward untraceability in the SRP protocol. Note that EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ is fix in the all rounds of SRP and an adversary can exploit this weakness to track a target tag. In particular, consider an adversary A performingthe following steps:
Learning phase:A sends a Corrupt(T 0 , ‫ܭ‬ ′ ) query in the round (i+1)and thus obtains
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T 0 , T 1 to be tested and sends a Test Autilizes the following simple decision rule:
Thus we have:
Proof: By the fact that EP‫ܥ‬ ௦ is a permanent value in the all rounds of the protocol, we have EPC ௦,୧ బ = EPC ௦,୧ିଵ బ . Thus we have the following procedure:
If
Untraceability
An authentication protocol for RFID systems should assure the privacy of a tag and its holder. However, many RFID protocols put it at risk by designing protocols where tags answer readers' queries with permanent values, thus performing traceability attacks not only possible but trivial. Now, we show how the SRP does not guarantee privacy location, thusallowing tags tracking.
Learning phase:A sends anExecute (R, T 0 , i+1) query in the round (i+1) by sending N R1 and thus obtains ‫1ܯ(‬ 
Note that T 0 does not update its secrets in the Learning phaseand uses the same secret key ‫ܭ‬ in both Learningand Challenge phase. Now we have the following result:
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the significant security flaws in the Yehet al. mutual authentication protocol were showed. We presented a powerful and practical attack on SRP which revealsthe permanent secret value of the target tag. This attack leads to tag and reader impersonation and desynchronization attack on this protocol. Moreover we showed this protocol does not have privacy aspects such as untraceability and backward untraceability. Our privacy analysis was presented in a formal privacy model.
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